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More than one out of every five principals leaves their school each year.  In some cases, these career
changes are driven by the choices of district leadership.  In other cases, principals initiate the move,
often demonstrating preferences to work in schools with higher achieving students from more advantaged
socioeconomic backgrounds. Principals often use schools with many poor or low-achieving students
as stepping stones to what they view as more desirable assignments. We use longitudinal data from
one large urban school district to study the relationship between principal turnover and school outcomes.
We find that principal turnover is, on average, detrimental to school performance. Frequent turnover
of school leadership results in lower teacher retention and lower student achievement gains. Leadership
changes are particularly harmful for high poverty schools, low-achieving schools, and schools with
many inexperienced teachers. These schools not only suffer from high rates of principal turnover but
are also unable to attract experienced successors. The negative effect of leadership changes can be
mitigated when vacancies are filled by individuals with prior experience leading other schools. However,
the majority of new principals in high poverty and low-performing schools lack prior leadership experience
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009 the Obama administration allocated four billion dollars to transform some of the 
nation’s worst schools. Persistently low-achieving schools are eligible to receive federal grants to 
support intervention efforts but must make radical changes to their school in order to receive 
funds, including replacing their principals and in some cases large portions of their teaching 
staffs (Dillon 2011; Tucker 2010; U.S. Department of Education 2010).
1 Though prior research 
provides evidence that principals have important effects on school outcomes and, thus, suggests 
that leadership change can be beneficial (Hallinger and Heck 1998; Hallinger and Heck 1996; 
Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, and Wahlstrom 2004), frequently replacing principals may create 
instability in schools that can potentially undermine improvement efforts (Dillon 2011). 
Leadership changes in the lowest achieving schools sometimes result from involuntary 
termination, however, voluntary principal exits are also quite common (Gates, Ringel, 
Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar, and Brown 2005; Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010; 
Papa, Lankford, and Wyckoff 2002a). Many schools—particularly schools with disadvantaged 
student populations—face high rates of principal turnover driven, in part, by principals’ desires 
to move to schools that they find more appealing (Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010).  
It is unclear a priori whether leadership changes are beneficial or detrimental to schools. 
Studies of leadership turnover in other types of organizations suggest that turnover can have 
either beneficial or detrimental effects on organizations depending on the circumstances 
(Abelson and Baysinger 1984; Mobley 1982). Turnover can have beneficial effects if it helps 
generate new ideas and innovation and purges an organization of ineffective leaders (Brown 
1982; Denis and Denis 1995). If ineffective principals are the most likely to leave, then 
                                                            




leadership turnover may be beneficial to schools. At the same time, too much turnover can have 
negative consequences if it leads to instability, loss of institutional memory, high training costs 
or lower employee commitment (Abelson and Baysinger 1984; Grusky 1960; Mobley 1982).  
  The effects of leadership changes on school performance have not been rigorously 
examined in prior research. Such analyses are complicated because in order to identify the 
effects of principal turnover, researchers need to separate the effects of principal turnover from 
the effects of factors that cause principals to leave their position that may also be associated with 
school performance.  In this paper we used detailed administrative data from one urban district to 
describe principal turnover and examine its effects on teacher retention and student achievement. 
We use changes over time within schools to identify these effects, carefully assessing the time 
trends in teacher retention and student achievement pre and post principal turnover. 
In describing principal turnover, we find that when principals leave a school it is usually 
due to a transfer to another school in the district rather than attrition from the principal profession 
via termination. Unlike studies of turnover in other organizations which tend to find that poor 
performance is a precursor to managerial exits, we find that school performance bears little 
association with principal turnover. Principals who transfer tend to move to schools with more 
advantaged and higher achieving student bodies relative to where they start, suggesting that 
principals may use their initial school assignments as stepping stones to more desirable future 
positions in other schools. The patterns of principal movement we observe are consistent with 
principals’ stated preferences for more advantaged and higher achieving schools.   
  In estimating the effects of principal turnover, we find that this mobility in principals’ 
career paths has detrimental consequences for schools. The departure of a principal is associated 
with higher teacher turnover rates and lower student achievement gains. The negative effects of 4 
 
principal turnover on student achievement are largest in schools with high concentrations of 
novice teachers, high concentrations of poor students and in schools with the lowest performance 
in the state’s accountability system. The latter group of schools is precisely the type that is the 
target of the recent federal reforms previously discussed. Poorly performing schools and those 
with high concentrations of poor students not only experience much higher principal turnover 
rates than other schools, but they are also unable to attract experienced new principals when 
vacancies arise.  
2.  BACKGROUND 
Many districts face very high rates of leadership turnover. Annual principal turnover rates 
in school districts throughout the country range from 15 to 30 percent each year with especially 
high rates of turnover in schools serving more low-income, minority and low-achieving students 
(Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 2008; DeAngelis and White 2011; Fuller and Young 2009; Gates 
et al. 2005; Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010; Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown, and Ghosh-
Dastidar 2004). A principal may leave his or her current school either because of involuntary 
departure due to firing or reassignment or voluntary departure based on a preference to work in a 
different school.  The former is the type of turnover generated by reform efforts intended to turn 
around failing schools by removing the leadership. Dismissal generally accounts for only a small 
proportion of all principal exits. Though there are no national figures on the frequency of 
principal firings, data from several school districts suggest that the majority of principal turnover 
(as experienced by individual schools) comes from intra-district transfers and not from exits 
(Gates et al. 2005; Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010; Ringel et al. 2004). District leadership 
may also reassign principals because they believe that bringing new leadership into schools on a 
regular basis is beneficial for school improvement (though we are aware of no empirical 5 
 
evidence that supports this belief).  However, there is evidence that principals’ movement across 
schools is, at least in part, voluntary (Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010). 
When principals transfer, they generally move to a school with more affluent and higher 
achieving students relative to where they start (Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010; Papa, 
Lankford, and Wyckoff 2002a). Principals usually do not receive pay increases when they 
change schools within a district; therefore; intra-district transfers can improve only non-
pecuniary benefits. Prior research suggests that many non-salary job characteristics affect teacher 
and principal preferences including student characteristics, school culture, facilities, and safety 
(Horng 2009; Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010; Loeb and Reininger 2004). These working 
conditions vary considerably across schools. Schools with less appealing attributes generally 
receive fewer applicants for vacant principal positions than do other schools, and therefore 
cannot be as selective when hiring replacements (Roza 2003). Consequently, new principals in 
such schools tend to have less experience leading other schools and are less likely to have 
advanced degrees than principals in other schools (Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010).  
2.1  Effects of Leadership Turnover 
Whether leadership changes are beneficial or detrimental for schools is unclear. No other 
study that we are aware of has examined the effects of principal turnover on school performance.  
Studies on the effects of leadership turnover in other types of organizations start with conflicting 
hypotheses and provide conflicting evidence. Some find that leadership turnover improves 
organizational performance (Brown 1982; Denis and Denis 1995; Grusky 1963; Virany, 
Tushman, and Romanelli 1992). This improvement happens when a manager in a struggling 
organization is replaced by a more effective manager. Other studies postulate or find that 
leadership turnover can be harmful for organizational performance (Audas, Dobson, and 6 
 
Goddard 2002; Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang 2010; Grusky 1963). In particular, frequent turnover 
may create instability in an organization. While poor performance may precede managerial 
change, when changes are frequent, they can be disruptive and make matters worse rather than 
better. Faltering organizations with high levels of turnover often have difficulty attracting 
experienced successors, who tend to be more effective (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1986). As a 
result, they become trapped in a “vicious circle” of high managerial turnover and declining 
performance (Grusky 1963). The “vicious circle” concept suggests that poorly performing 
organizations are especially vulnerable to the negative effects of leadership turnover. A final 
relevant group of studies hypothesize that leadership change plays no role in organizational 
performance (Brown 1982; Eitzen and Yetman 1972; Gamson and Scotch 1964; Smith, Carson, 
and Alexander 1984). This hypothesis, originally posited by Gamson and Scotch (1964), 
maintains that success results from organizational processes that are largely outside the control 
of middle management. Dismissing a manager is a gesture aimed at appeasing stakeholders or of 
deflecting attention from shortcomings at higher levels of management. Therefore, any 
relationship between management succession and performance is spurious.  Gamson and Scotch 
(1964) refer to this idea as the “ritual scapegoating” theory. From this perspective, managers are 
either relatively unimportant or they are all of similar quality such that it makes little difference 
who fills the leadership role.  
These hypotheses were developed in studies of involuntary leadership turnover when 
managers in struggling organizations are replaced. The effects of leadership turnover in schools 
may differ. Given the dynamics of the principal labor market described above and the voluntary 
nature of most principal turnover, leadership change in schools may not provide the beneficial 
mechanism of replacing less effective leaders with more effective leaders as often as it does in 7 
 
the private sector. Moreover, research on school reform suggests that organizational stability is 
an important component of a well running school and that frequent changes to staff undermine 
efforts to effectively implement a school’s instructional program (Fuller and Young 2009; 
Hallinger and Heck 1996; Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon, and Schwartz 2009). Because of 
its disruptive effects, leadership turnover may be particularly likely to negatively impact school 
performance (Brown 1982), particularly in faltering schools with lower resource levels, more 
novice teachers, and consistently less effective leadership (Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 2008; 
Condron and Roscigno 2003; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002).  
2.2  Effects of Principals on School Performance  
Leadership turnover may impact school outcomes because leadership itself can impact 
school outcomes.  A range of studies provide evidence that leadership effects can work through a 
variety of mechanisms. These studies have assessed leaders’ abilities to recruit high quality 
teachers, to motivate teachers, to articulate school vision and goals, to allocate resources and to 
develop organizational structures to support instruction and learning (Eberts and Stone 1988; 
Grissom and Loeb Forthcoming; Hallinger and Heck 1996; Harris, Rutledge, Ingle, and 
Thompson 2010; Horng, Klasik, and Loeb 2010; Jacob and Lefgren 2005; Leithwood, Louis, 
Anderson, and Wahlstrom 2004; Loeb, Kalogrides, and Béteille 2010). Strong school leadership 
is also likely to be an essential component of school improvement efforts (Bryk, Sebring, 
Allensworth, Luppescu, and Easton 2010).  
Though logic suggests that principals are important for the performance of schools, it is 
less clear from prior research which observable attributes of principals are associated with high 
performance. Many prior studies that attempt to identify the effects of principal characteristics or 
behaviors on school performance fail to account for factors that confound that relationship 8 
 
(Ballou and Podgursky 1993; Brewer 1993; Eberts and Stone 1988; Hallinger and Heck 1996; 
Louis, Leithwood, Wahlstrom, and Anderson 2010). More effective schools may attract 
principals with different characteristics, even if those characteristics do not improve 
effectiveness. Simple correlations could mistakenly attribute cause to these correlational 
relationships.   
Two recent studies have carefully examined the relationship between principal 
experience and school performance using district panel data and methods similar to ours 
(Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 2008; Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff 2009). These studies find a 
positive relationship between principal experience and student test scores. No studies, however, 
have rigorously examined the relationship between principal turnover and school outcomes. 
Though principal tenure at a school is partially a function of principal turnover (i.e., schools with 
high turnover rates employ principals with fewer years of school-specific experience), the two 
measures are conceptually distinct. The effect of turnover on school performance may be 
negative, in part, because it leads to a reduction in principal experience at schools that experience 
turnover. However, turnover could have negative effects on school performance independent 
from the relative inexperience of new principals to a school. Constant churning of principals in 
and out of schools can create instability that may undermine performance. That is, the instability 
created by principal turnover could have negative effects on school performance even if 
succeeding principals are identical in their skills and knowledge to the exiting principals they 
replace.  
In this paper we use data from one of the largest public school districts in the United 
States to examine the consequences of leadership change on school performance. We begin by 
describing the principal labor market in this district, including rates of turnover from different 9 
 
types of schools and the characteristics of the schools to which principals transfer. We then 
examine the relationship between principal turnover and school-level outcomes and variations in 
the magnitude of these relationships in different types of schools. We find that principal turnover 
has negative effects on average achievement and particularly large negative effects on the 
achievement of students attending high poverty schools, those receiving failing grades within the 
state accountability system, and those with many first-year teachers. We conclude that principal 
preferences for easier to staff schools leads to considerable leadership turnover in schools with 
more disadvantaged students. These career pathways limit poor and low-achieving students’ 
exposure to stable leadership, which negative affects their achievement.  
3.  DATA 
The data used in this study come from administrative files on all staff, students, and 
schools in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) district from the 2003-04 through 
the 2008-09 school years. The school district we study, M-DCPS, is the largest public school 
district in Florida and the fourth largest in the United States, trailing only New York City, Los 
Angeles Unified, and the City of Chicago School District. In 2008, M-DCPS enrolled almost 
352,000 students, more than 200,000 of whom were Hispanic. Nearly 90 percent of students in 
the district are either black or Hispanic and 60 percent qualify for free or reduced priced lunches. 
Over our observation period there are between 360 and 400 schools in the district. This provides 
ample power for identifying the effects of school characteristics (i.e., leadership turnover) on 
student and teacher outcomes. Basic descriptive information for the principals, teachers, and 
students that make up our sample is shown in Table 1.  
The M-DCPS staff database includes demographic measures, prior experience in the 
district, current position, and highest degree earned for all district staff from the 2003-04 through 10 
 
the 2008-09 school years. We use this information to create five measures of principal 
experience and turnover in each year. The first measure tracks whether the school has a new 
principal in the current year. This measure captures only whether the principal is new to the 
school and not whether he or she has prior experience as a principal in other schools in the 
district. The second measure is whether the school has a first time new principal at their school.  
These principals have no prior principal experience as principals in the district. The third 
measure captures whether a school has a new principal who has previously served as principal at 
another school in the district. Distinguishing between these last two measures allows us to gauge 
whether achievement declines when schools are under the direction of a new principal because 
new principals have less experience.  A fourth measure of experience tracks whether the school 
has a new principal who began with a temporary or interim status. Temporary/interim principals 
are usually appointed by the Superintendent to fill a vacancy which occurs as the result of an 
emergency situation — often in the middle of the school year. Finally, our fifth measure is a 
simple measure of school-specific experience which each principal’s tenure at their current 
school.  
We also use the staff-level data to examine the association between principal turnover 
and subsequent changes to teacher turnover. To examine teacher turnover following leadership 
transitions we use the staff database which allows us to observe teacher transfers between 
schools in the district as well as attrition from the district after any given year. These data also 
include teacher race, gender, highest degree earned, experience, and age which we use as control 
variables in our models. 
In addition to these staff-level data, we have test score data and basic demographic 
information for all students in the district which we can link to classrooms (teachers) and to 11 
 
schools. The demographic variables include student race, gender, free/reduced price lunch 
eligibility, and whether students are limited English proficient. These variables serve as control 
variables in our models. The test score data include math and reading scores from the Florida 
Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). The FCAT is given in math and reading to students in 
grades 3-10. It is also given in writing and science to a subset of grades, though we only use 
math and reading tests in our analyses.  The FCAT includes criterion referenced tests measuring 
selected benchmarks from the Sunshine State Standards (SSS). We standardize students’ test 
scores to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one within each grade and school-year.  
4.  METHODS 
Our analysis includes three components: (1) we descriptively examine patterns of 
principal turnover in the district; (2) we identify the relationship between principal turnover and 
(a) teacher turnover and (b) student achievement; and (3) we describe variation in the 
relationship between principal turnover and school outcomes by school characteristics (poverty 
level, performance in the state accountability system, concentration of first-year teachers).  
The second and third components of our analysis seek to isolate the effect of principal 
transitions on school outcomes, recognizing that principal turnover may be endogenous to other 
school characteristics. Schools with frequent principal turnover may differ from schools with 
more stable leadership in a variety of ways — they may have less stable teacher and student 
populations or other less favorable working conditions such as safety concerns, disciplinary 
problems, or insufficient resources. Such factors are likely to be negatively associated with 
school outcomes such as achievement. Though we do not have a perfect solution to this 
endogeneity problem, we seek to minimize the potential bias by including a rich set of control 12 
 
variables in all our models as well as school and/or student fixed effects.  We also run analyses 
to uncover the likelihood of bias. We describe these approaches and their implications below. 
4.1 Teacher  Turnover 
To examine the relationship between principal and teacher turnover we use data on all 
staff in the district and estimate a logistic regression predicting whether a teacher leaves their 
current school at the end of the year as a function of the measures of principal turnover and 
experience. In our full model we include controls for teacher characteristics (race, gender, 
highest degree, age, experience), time-varying school characteristics (percent receiving 
free/reduced priced lunches, percent minority, percent low achieving, enrollment), and school 
fixed effects. The types of schools that have high principal turnover may also have high teacher 
turnover with the former not necessarily causing the latter. We therefore prefer a model with 
school fixed effects since it shows the relationship between principal turnover and teacher 
turnover within the same school. That is, we are able to examine whether teacher turnover in a 
given school is higher in years that the school has a new principal compared to years that the 
school does not have a new principal.  The model is estimated with the following equation:   
  Pr        1   
  
              ( 1 )  
                                                                         
The probability that teacher j leaves their current school s in year t is a function of whether their 
school has a new principal in year t, teacher characteristics (    , time varying attributes of 
schools (   , year fixed effects (     and school fixed effects      . In other models we replace 
the new principal variable with the other measures of principal turnover and experience 
discussed above.  
4.2  Student Achievement 13 
 
In order to examine the relationship between principal turnover and student achievement, 
we merge the principal database with our student data base. Given concerns about the 
endogeneity of principal turnover, we estimate specifications of our student achievement models 
that include school and/or student fixed effects. This approach allows us to discern whether 
students learn less in years that their schools have a new principal compared to how much 
students in the same school learn in other years when their school does not have a new principal. 
The school fixed effect removes any stable characteristics of schools that may be 
associated with both the likelihood of principal turnover and lower student achievement. 
However, there may still be time-varying negative shocks that influence both turnover and 
achievement declines. While we do not have a perfect solution to this endogeneity problem, we 
use two approaches which reduce the potential for bias. First, in all models we control for the 
percentage of teachers at a school that are new in each year. If something bad happened at a 
school in the year before a new principal arrived, we expect that this will be absorbed by the 
teacher turnover rate. Second, as checks of the robustness of our estimates we include a control 
for the year before a new principal arrived in addition to the school fixed effect which takes out 
the average for the school across all years. If schools that experience a decrease in achievement 
in a given year are more likely to see their principal leave, then controlling for the year before 
the new principal arrives should account for this. Our estimates are generally unaffected by the 
inclusion of this measure or by the inclusion/exclusion of the teacher turnover rate.  
Our estimates for the effect of principal turnover on student achievement are identified 
from students attending schools that experience at least one principal transition over the years in 
which they are tested. The following equation describes the model:     
                                                                                            (2) 14 
 
where the achievement of student i in school s in year t is a function of their prior achievement 
(         , time varying-attributes of students (     , their classes (   ) and their schools (   ), 
whether the student’s school has a new principal                 , and student, school, and 
year fixed effects. The parameter of interest is   which shows the difference in the average 
achievement of students in years when their school has a new principal compared to years in 
which they do not. In other models we replace the new principal variable with the other measures 
of principal turnover and experience discussed above.  
4.3  Interaction Models 
 In the analyses described previously, we examine the average effect of principal turnover 
on school outcomes. However, we expect that the magnitude of this effect might depend on 
characteristics of schools. Certain types of schools may have higher rates of principal turnover 
and more difficulty attracting effective and experienced principals as successors. For example, if 
schools with high concentrations of poor or low achieving students attract less effective or 
experienced principals, then turnover might have larger negative effects in such schools.  
To examine variation in the relationship between principal turnover and student 
achievement, we include interactions between school characteristics and whether the school has 
a new principal. We examine whether the effect of turnover is different for high poverty schools 
relative to lower poverty schools and whether the effect is different for failing schools (i.e., 
schools that receive an F grade from the Florida accountability system) relative to higher 
performing schools.
2 We also expect that leadership turnover might be more consequential for 
                                                            
2 School grades are determined by a formula used by the district that weighs the percentage of students meeting high 
standards across various subjects tested, the percentage of students making learning gains, whether adequate 
progress is made among the lowest 25 percent of students, and the percentage of eligible students who are tested. 
For more information, see: http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org/pdf/0708/2008SchoolGradesTAP.pdf 
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schools that employ more novice teachers. Strong school leadership may be especially important 
for novice teachers who may benefit most from mentoring and support from their principal. 
Schools with a more stable senior teaching force may be better equipped to handle the departure 
of a principal since teachers in such schools are more familiar with their jobs and are likely to 
work more autonomously with less oversight from the school leadership. To examine whether 
the effects of principal turnover is different for schools with many novice teachers we include an 
interaction between whether the school has a new principal and a measure of whether the school 
is in the top quartile in terms of the percentage of their teachers who are in their first year.   
5.  RESULTS 
    We begin by describing principal turnover rates in M-DCPS as well as in several other 
school districts and professions for comparison purposes. Table 2 lists principal turnover rates as 
well as turnover rates for other managerial professions. In M-DCPS, 22 percent of principals 
leave their current school each year and most of those who leave transfer to another school in the 
district. The rates are similar in other districts: Milwaukee and North Carolina schools have 
annual turnover rates of around 20 percent, San Francisco has a turnover rate of 26 percent, New 
York City has a turnover rate of 24 percent, and Texas has a turnover rate of 30 percent. As 
Table 2 shows, in general, managerial turnover is fairly high in other professions as well — 
ranging anywhere from 10 percent to 35 percent depending on the industry (Denis and Denis 
1995; DiPrete and Krecker 1991; Fee and Hadlock 2004; Larsen 1993).  
  The turnover rate of principals varies across schools. Table 3 shows the principal 
turnover rate in M-DCPS for schools serving different student populations. The first column lists 
the total percentage of principals who left their current school at the end of the year, while the 
second and third columns separate exits via transfer to another school in the district from exits 16 
 
via attrition from the district. Principal turnover rates are highest in schools serving high 
concentrations of poor, minority and low achieving students. In M-DCPS, 28 percent of 
principals in schools in the top quartile of students receiving subsidized lunches (high poverty) 
leave each year compared to 18 percent of principals in schools in the bottom quartile (low 
poverty). Nearly 30 percent of principals in schools with high concentrations of low achieving 
students leave each year compared to only 16 percent of principals in schools with low 
concentrations of low achieving students. We find similar results in Milwaukee and San 
Francisco from which we also have data (not shown), as do Gates et al. (2004) in their study of 
North Carolina and Ringel et al. (2004) in their study of Illinois.  
5.1  Are Principals More Likely to Leave Following a Year of Poor Performance? 
Prior studies of leadership turnover in other professions have found that leaders are more 
likely to leave following a period of poor performance (Allen, Panian, and Lotz 1979; Brown 
1982; Denis and Denis 1995). We examine whether principal exits are associated with the 
performance of their school by predicting student test score gains in a given year as a function of 
whether a school’s principal leaves at the end of that year. We also separate principal exists via 
transfer and via attrition. The results are shown in Table 4. The coefficients are all essentially 
zero and not statistically significant. This suggests that poor school performance is not, on 
average, a precursor to principal turnover. This analysis also suggests that schools that 
experience principal exits are not necessarily experiencing a downward achievement trajectory 
which could confound our estimates of the effect of turnover on student achievement.  
  Since the majority of principal turnover results from principals transferring schools 
within the district, we next turn to an analysis of principals’ school preferences and transfer 
patterns. In Table 5 we compare the characteristics of principals’ current schools with the 17 
 
characteristics of the schools they report they would most like to work in. The self-report data 
come from a survey of principals in Miami that we administered in 2010.
3 We asked principals if 
they could work in any school in the district (other than their current school) which would be 
their first choice. We compare the characteristics of the student bodies in their current school 
with their first choice school. The results show that principals’ first choice schools have fewer 
poor, black and low achieving students than their current school as well as fewer students who 
are suspended or chronically absent.  
Principals’ stated preferences mirror their actual transfer patterns.  We compare the 
characteristics of principals’ initial schools to the characteristics of the schools to which they 
transfer in Table 6. There is one observation for each principal-school combination and we 
predict a school characteristic as a function of whether the school is the principals’ first, second, 
third, or fourth or more school. The models also include a principal fixed effect. Principals’ first 
school is the omitted category, thus the coefficients show the difference in school characteristics 
between a principal’s first school and each subsequent school. The models are only identified 
from principals who serve at more than one school. The results from these analyses show that 
principals who transfer tend to move to schools with higher achieving students, fewer poor 
students, fewer minority students, and fewer students with attendance problems. For example, 
principals’ second and third schools have about 9 percent fewer low achieving students than their 
first schools, 4 percent more high achieving students than their first schools, 8-9 percent fewer 
poor and minority students than their first school and 3-6 percent fewer students who are 
chronically absent. Few principals serve at four or more schools during our observation period so 
those coefficients are less precisely estimated. These results are consistent with principals’ 
reports of their school preferences.  
                                                            
3 We administered an online survey to all principals in M-DCPS in May of 2010 with a response rate of 55 percent. 18 
 
Taken together, the results presented thus far suggest that principals are not leaving when 
their school is performing poorly but, rather, they tend to leave when vacancies arise at easier to 
staff schools given that they find such schools more appealing.  
5.2  Principal Turnover and School Outcomes 
Next, we turn to an examination of the relationship between principal turnover and both 
teacher turnover (Table 7) and student achievement (Tables 8 and 9).  We run two models for 
each analysis. The first model includes a detailed set of control variables and shows whether the 
outcome differs in schools and years when there is a new principal in comparison to similar 
schools and years.
4 The second model includes school fixed effects asking whether within a 
school the outcome differs in years where there is a new principal compared to years when there 
is not a new principal. While the last specification is the cleanest causally, it identifies the effect 
only from the small variation within schools across years. Tables 8 and 9 include one additional 
model that adds a student fixed effect to the model with school fixed effects and the controls.  
In Table 7 we find that turnover among teachers is higher when a new principal takes 
over at a school. The first row of the Table shows that the odds that a teacher leaves his or her 
current school are about 17 percent higher in years and schools that have a new principal.  The 
direction of the results remains in the next two models which aim to identify the causal effect of 
principal turnover on teacher turnover. Within schools, the odds of teacher turnover are 
approximately 8.7 percentage points higher in the years in which there is a new principal.  These 
results are marginally significant and not substantially different from the model with controls 
                                                            
4 The control variables used in our teacher turnover models include: race, gender, age, age
2, highest degree earned, 
experience (entered as dummies and top coded at 21 or more years), percentage of students receiving free/reduced 
priced lunches at the school, percent minority at the school, logged school enrollment, average math achievement at 
the school and year fixed effects. The control variables used in our student achievement models include: prior 
achievement, race, gender, whether the student is limited English proficient, free/reduced priced lunch receipt, 
whether the student was retained in the prior year, school and class percentage free/reduced priced lunches, limited 
English proficient and average prior achievement as well as year and grade fixed effects.  
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instead of fixed effects (11.3 percentage points) which is strongly statistically significant and has 
greater statistical power.   
Teacher turnover might be higher in years when schools have a new principal because of 
the relative inexperience of new principals. More experienced principals might be more skilled in 
developing effective policies to retain their teachers or supporting a collegial environment that 
curbs turnover. In addition, a new principal might be more likely than a more experienced 
principal to bring a new approach to the school that is in conflict with teachers’ preferences; thus 
causing teachers to seek other positions.  In the second panel of Table 7 we add a control for the 
number of prior years of experience that the principal has as a principal in any school. 
Controlling for this measure reduces the magnitude of the new principal effect on turnover 
somewhat but there is still a significant positive relationship between principal and teacher 
turnover in the model with control variables (model 2). This result suggests that the lack of 
experience of a new principal to a school explains some but not all of the positive relationship 
between principal and teacher turnover. The final model that includes school fixed effects does 
not show a significant relationship but most of the difference between models 2 and 3 comes 
from an increase in the standard error, likely due to the substantially reduced variation when we 
include school fixed effects. 
Another way of gauging the importance of experience in explaining the relationship 
between principal and teacher turnover is to distinguish between cases when the new principal is 
a first time new principal and cases when the new principal has prior experience as a principal in 
another school. This analysis is shown in the third panel of Table7. The relationship appears 
somewhat stronger for new principals with prior experience than for new principals without prior 
experience, though the differences are not statistically significant in any of the specifications.  20 
 
The similarity in the magnitude of the effects of having a new first time principal and a new 
principal with prior experience at another school suggests that whether the new principal is 
experienced or not is not an important influence on teacher turnover. Taken together these results 
suggest that leadership instability tends to generate greater instability among the teaching force 
that goes beyond the turnover associated with having a less experienced principal.  
The final two panels of Table 7 give estimates of the effects of having a temporary or 
interim principal and of principal experience on teacher attrition.  We see that on average 
teachers turn over more under temporary or interim principals but that this relationship is small 
(3.6 percent in the model with controls and 1.6 percent in the school fixed effects model) and not 
statistically different from zero. The final panel shows that teachers are less likely to leave under 
principals with longer tenure at their school.  An extra year of experience at a school is 
associated with a 4 percentage point reduction in the odds of turnover in the school fixed effects 
model, but these estimates are not statistically significant.   
In Table 8 (math) and Table 9 (reading) we examine the relationship between principal 
turnover and student achievement. Model 1 includes a measure of lagged achievement, the 
percentage of new teachers at the school, student, school, and classroom control variables as well 
as grade and year fixed effects.  Model 2 adds a school fixed effect and model 3 adds a student 
fixed effect. We focus our discussion on models 2 and 3 since they bring us closest to identifying 
a causal effect of principal turnover on achievement. These models use variation in the presence 
of new leaders within schools (across time) to examine whether students learn less in years when 
their school has a new  principal compared to years when their school does not have a new 
principal.  21 
 
The effects are relatively small but consistent across models and outcome measures. In 
Table 8 we find that students make lower achievement gains in math when their school has a 
new principal (first panel), when their school has a new first time principal (without prior 
experience in another school) (third panel), and when their school has a temporary or interim 
principal (fourth panel). Students also have higher learning gains in math when their principal 
has longer tenure at their school (fifth panel). Interestingly, there is no negative effect on math 
achievement when a school has a new principal who previously served as a principal at another 
school in the district (third panel). This suggests that the skills and experience that principals 
bring to their new schools are important and that lack of prior experience explains much of the 
negative effect of turnover on math achievement.  
One concern with these models is that schools that are on a downward achievement 
trajectory might also be more likely to experience principal turnover, which could potentially 
bias our estimates. We account for this possibility in the second panel by controlling for the year 
prior to the new principal (similar to the analysis shown in Table 4). Our estimates of the effect 
of having a new principal on math achievement remain relatively unchanged with the inclusion 
of this control.  
The results for reading achievement in Table 9 are fairly similar to those discussed for 
math thus far.  We see a negative relationship between achievement and having a new principal 
and we see a positive relationship between achievement and principal experience at the school.  
On the other hand, for reading the effect of having a new principal with prior experience is just 
as negative as having a new principal without prior experience and we do not find a negative 
effect for temporary or interim principals.   22 
 
In the sixth panel of Tables 8 and 9 we add interactions between years of prior principal 
experience and the new principal indicator. This principal experience measure reflects years of 
experience in any school in the district and is distinct from the measure of experience used in 
panel five of Tables 8 and 9, which only captures years of experience at the current school. For 
math (Table 8) the main effect on new principal in model 4 suggests that student achievement is 
about .013 standard deviations lower when schools have a new principal without any prior 
principal experience (i.e., when prior years of experience is equal to zero). However, the 
interaction between new principal and prior principal experience is positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that the negative effect of having a new principal is smaller when new 
principals to a school have more prior experience serving as a principal in other schools. The 
results for reading achievement in Table 9 are a bit different. These results suggest that overall 
years of principal experience is positively related to reading achievement and the magnitude of 
that relationship is similar or slightly smaller in schools with a new principal. Though the 
negative interaction term in models 1 and 2 suggests that principal experience is less important in 
schools with a new principal, the interactions are still smaller than the main effect on principal 
experience suggesting that principal experience is still related to reading achievement in schools 
with new principals. These results suggest that principal experience is important in schools with 
new principals and that the negative effect of leadership turnover on student achievement can be 
mitigated through the recruitment of experienced succeeding principals. 
In sum, we find that principal turnover is positively associated with teacher turnover and 
negatively associated with student achievement. These results provide fairly consistent evidence 
that greater instability among leadership is detrimental to school outcomes and that new 23 
 
principals without any prior experience seem to be less effective than their more experienced 
counterparts.  
5.3 Interaction  Models 
In our final set of analyses we examine whether the association between leadership 
changes and student achievement is different in low performing schools, high poverty schools, 
and in schools with high concentrations of novice teachers. In Table 10 we predict student 
achievement as a function of our full set of student, school, and classroom controls as well as the 
relevant fixed effects. In models 1 and 2 we include a variable indicating whether the school 
received a failing accountability grade (i.e., an “F” grade) in the prior year as well as an 
interaction between whether the school had a new principal in the current year and earned a 
failing grade in the prior year. In models 3 and 4 we include a variable indicating whether the 
school was in the top quartile of students receiving subsidized lunches (high poverty) and an 
interaction between this variable and whether the school has a new principal. In models 5 and 6 
we include a variable indicating that the school was in the top quartile in terms of their 
proportion of first-year teachers and interact this variable with the new principal indicator. We 
are interested in the interaction terms in these models since they show whether principal turnover 
is more consequential for students attending failing schools, high poverty schools, or schools 
with many first-year teachers. We also estimate these models using a measure of principal 
experience at a school in lieu of the new principal indicator. 
The negative relationship between principal turnover and math and reading achievement 
is stronger in failing schools and in high poverty schools. The negative effect of principal 
turnover on math achievement is also larger in schools with high concentrations of novice 
teachers, though we do not find similar effects for reading achievement. Here we focus our 24 
 
discussion of the models with student fixed effects (models 2, 4, and 6) though most of these 
results are similar in models that exclude them (models 1, 3, and 5). While there is little or no 
relationship between having a new principal and achievement in non-poor schools, higher 
performing schools, or schools with fewer novice teachers (shown by the main effects), students 
in failing schools have reading and math achievement that is about .04-.06 standard deviations 
lower in years when they have a new principal, students in high poverty schools have reading 
and math achievement that is .02-.03 standard deviations lower in years when they have a new 
principal, and students in schools with high concentrations of novice teachers have math 
achievement that is about .02 standard deviations lower in years when they have a new principal. 
Similarly, principal tenure at a school bears a stronger relationship to achievement gains in high 
poverty schools, failing schools, and schools with high concentrations of novice teachers than in 
more advantaged and higher performing schools. Instability among school leadership is therefore 
more consequential for high poverty and failing schools, schools which also tend to have more 
frequent turnover. 
The effect of turnover may be different for high poverty and failing schools if such 
schools differ in their ability to attract experienced successors. We examine this descriptively in 
Table 11, which shows the characteristics of new principals in different types of schools. We list 
the proportion of new principals with prior experience, years of prior principal experience in the 
district, and the proportion of principals with master’s degrees. As expected, new principals in 
high poverty schools have less prior experience as a principal and are less likely to have a 
master’s degree or higher compared to new principals in schools with fewer low-income 
students.  About 65 percent of new principals in low poverty schools have previously served as 
principal at another school in the district compared to only 30 percent of new principals in high 25 
 
poverty schools. Similarly, new principals in high poverty schools have about half as many prior 
years experience as principals in low poverty schools (roughly 4 versus 2 years).  New principals 
in high poverty schools are also less likely to have a masters degree (65 percent in low poverty 
schools compared to 56 percent in high poverty schools).  Therefore, the effect of having a new 
principal may be more negative for high poverty schools because such schools are unable to 
attract the most experienced and credentialed successors.  
6.  DISCUSSION  
  Many school districts throughout the country—including the district studied in this 
paper—face high rates of principal turnover (Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 2008; Gates, Ringel, 
Santibanez, Ross, and Chung 2003; Papa, Lankford, and Wyckoff 2002b). While turnover 
averages approximately 20 percent in the district we study as a whole, it is about a third higher in 
schools with high concentrations of poor, minority and low achieving students. Though we do 
not have data on why principals choose to leave their schools, we find evidence that suggests that 
one likely reason is a desire to move to easier to staff schools. When asked via a survey, 
principals indicate that they would prefer to work at a school that is higher achieving than the 
school in which they are currently employed. Those who switch schools tend to move to schools 
with fewer students in poverty and fewer low achieving students compared to where they start. 
This is consistent with previous work studying principals’ preferences for schools  (Loeb, 
Kalogrides, and Horng 2010).  
Schools are not the only type of organization that experiences voluntary turnover—for 
example, managers may also move among similar firms in the for-profit sector. However, 
schools are more constrained than private firms in the resources they can deploy to keep 
effective employees. Given the rigidities of the salary schedule for teachers and school 26 
 
administrators in most districts, there are few opportunities to increase one’s earnings outside of 
acquiring more experience or further credentials. The career trajectories of school personnel 
therefore may be more affected by non-pecuniary benefits such as positive working conditions 
than are other workers (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002; 
Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng 2010).  
  Since much of the turnover we document is likely to be voluntary and driven by a 
preference to move to easier to serve schools, it is not surprising that we find no evidence of a 
relationship between school performance and the likelihood that a principal leaves a school. 
While some principals whose schools are performing poorly may leave either via termination or 
by their own accord, some principals whose schools are performing well also leave. A proven 
track record in improving the performance of a school is likely to make a principal a viable 
candidate for vacancies in other, more appealing schools. Prior research on the effects of 
leadership turnover on organizational performance suggests that turnover can be beneficial in 
instances where ineffective leaders are replaced (Grusky 1963; Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli 
1992). But the dynamics of the principal labor market we document suggest that the majority of 
turnover is not driven by an attempt to replace ineffective leaders. 
The consequences of the turnover we document are clearly negative, on average. There 
are a variety of possible explanations for these negative effects and we do not distinguish them in 
this paper.  For example, others have hypothesized that turnover may undermine reform efforts 
and reduce employee buy-in, fracture professional networks developed among employees and 
leadership, create unclear goals and expectations, and make for a less stable and desirable 
working environment (Abelson and Baysinger 1984; Fuller and Young 2009; Hallinger and Heck 
1996; Steinberg 2000). These disruptive effects of turnover for schools could be cause for 27 
 
concern, particularly in high poverty and failing schools where turnover rates are quite high and 
the negative effects of turnover are large. Our results suggest that practices that bring in 
experienced (and effective) administrators can mitigate some of the problems created by 
turnover. Turnover’s negative effects are smaller when vacancies are filled with principals who 
have prior experience leading other schools in the district. At the same time, the types of schools 
that hire less experienced new principals (i.e., high poverty schools) tend to suffer more harm 
from leadership instability. 
Turnover might have less detrimental effects on more advantaged schools because they 
have less frequent turnover and because they attract more experienced replacements. It is also 
possible that principals matter less in these schools – these schools have more advantaged and 
higher achieving students and likely have an easier time attracting strong teachers. Turnover in 
these schools might also occur more often from retirement rather than a desire to move to an 
easier to serve school. In instances where the principal’s exit is anticipated (i.e., due to 
retirement) there might be more mechanisms in place to ensure a smoother transition. Overall, 
our results suggest that principals’ desire to work in schools with more affluent and high 
achieving students reduces disadvantaged students’ exposure to experienced and stable school 
personnel (both teachers and principals) which has negative consequences for their learning.  28 
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Total Years of Experience in District 22.37 8.14





Masters Degree or Higher 0.70
Total Principal Observations 2041
Percentage of Principals who Serve Two or More Schools 0.35
Percentage of Principals who Serve Three or More Schools 0.10
Teacher Characteristics






Master's Degree or Higher 0.40





Limited English Proficient 0.16
Retained in Year Prior 0.04
Eligible for Subsidized Lunch 0.61
Total Student Observations (all students) 2145115
Total Student Observations (with test scores) 1246335





Source Profession School District(s) Time Period Annual Turnover Rate
PRINCIPALS
Authors' calculations from data 
provided by district Principals
Miami‐Dade County 
Public Schools 2003‐2009
22% (Total); 16% 
(Transfer); 6% (Attrit)
Authors' calculations from data 
provided by district Principals
Milwaukee Public 
Schools 2000‐2008
19% (Total); 11% 
(Transfer); 8% (Attrit)
Authors' calculations from data 
provided by district Principals
San Francisco Unified 
School District 2003‐2009
26% (Total); 18% 
(Transfer); 8% (Attrit)
Authors' calculations from data 
provided by district Principals New York City 1999‐2008 24% (Total)
Papa, Lankford, Wyckoff (2002) First Time Principals New York State 1992 36% (Total)
Gates et al. (2004) Principals North Carolina State 1987‐2001
18% (Total); 9% 
(Transfer); 9% (Attrit)
Ringel et al. (2004) Principals Illinois State 1987‐2001
14% (Total); 7% 
(Transfer); 7% (Attrit)
DeAngelis and White (2011) Prinicpals Illinois State 2001‐2008 20% (Total)
Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 
(2009) Principals Texas State 1995‐2001 30% (Total)
Steinberg (2000) Principals  Washington State 1999 15% (Attrit)
OTHER LEADERSHIP PROFESSIONS
DiPrete and Krecker (1991)
Professional and 
Managerial Workers ‐‐‐ 1980s 10%
Sorensen (2000) TV Station Supervisors ‐‐‐ 1953‐1988 15%
Audas et al. (1999) English Soccer Coaches ‐‐‐ 1972‐1999 36%
Pfeffer and Davis‐Blake (1986)
National Basketball 
Association Coaches ‐‐‐ 1977‐1981 25%
Fee and Hadlock (2000) Newspaper Managers ‐‐‐ 1950‐1993 15‐16%
Allen, Panian, and Lotz (1979)
Major League Baseball 
Coaches ‐‐‐ 1920‐1973 36%
Denis and Denis (1995) CEOs ‐‐‐ 1985‐1988 22%






All Schools 22% 16% 5%
Percent Free Lunch
Quartile 1 18% 12% 5%
Quartile 4 28% 21% 6%
Percent Minority
Quartile 1 20% 14% 5%
Quartile 4 28% 23% 4%
Percent Low Achieving(Math)
Quartile 1 16% 9% 6%
Quartile 4 29% 22% 6%
Percent Being Suspended
Quartile 1 19% 12% 7%
Quartile 4 27% 22% 5%
Percent Absent 21 or More Days
Quartile 1 17% 10% 6%
Quartile 4 27% 22% 5%
School Accountability Grade
A 19% 13% 6%
B 20% 14% 5%
C 26% 20% 6%
D 25% 19% 6%
F 48% 43% 5%
School Level
Elementary 21% 16% 5%
Middle 23% 18% 4%
High 25% 20% 4%
Notes: Transfer refers to the percentage of principals who transfer to 
another school in the district at the end of an academic year. Attrition 
refers to the percentage of principals who are no longer observed as a 







Year Prior to Principal Exit ‐0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Model 2
Year Prior to Principal Exit (via Attrition) 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
Year Prior to Principal Exit (via Transfer) ‐0.003 0.000
(0.005) (0.004)
Control for Lag of Outcome X X
Time‐Varying Student Controls X X
Time‐Varying School Controls X X
Time‐Varying Classroom Controls X X
School Fixed Effect X X
Grade Fixed Effect X X
Year Fixed Effect X X
Clustered Standard Errors (by School‐Year) X X







 Percent F/R Lunch 0.73 0.68 0.05
 Percent Black 0.30 0.24 0.06
 Percent Lowest Achievement Level in Math 0.19 0.11 0.08
 Percent Highest Achievement Level in Math 0.09 0.12 ‐0.03
 Percent Lowest Achievement Level in Reading 0.25 0.18 0.07
 Percent Highest Achievement Level in Reading 0.07 0.09 ‐0.02
 Standardized Math Score ‐0.14 0.09 ‐0.23
 Standardized Reading Score ‐0.12 0.09 ‐0.21
 Percent Students Suspended this Year 0.08 0.05 0.03
 Percent Students Chronically Absent this Year 0.10 0.06 0.04
Notes: Figures are from a 2010 survey of principals in Miami‐Dade. Principals were asked if they could 






Second School Served as Principal  17.944 ***  ‐0.093 ***   0.037 ***  ‐0.081 **   ‐0.091 **   ‐0.027 *  
         (2.449)    (0.014)    (0.006)    (0.025)    (0.031)    (0.012)   
Third School Served as Principal  19.768 ***  ‐0.093 ***   0.036 **   ‐0.088 +    ‐0.093     ‐0.057 ** 
         (4.650)    (0.026)    (0.012)    (0.046)    (0.058)    (0.022)   
Fourth or Fifth School Served as Principa  24.930 *    ‐0.156 **    0.035     ‐0.005     ‐0.081     ‐0.040   
         (9.880)    (0.056)    (0.026)    (0.100)    (0.126)    (0.050)   
Constant 304.685 ***   0.250 ***   0.060 ***   0.727 ***   0.400 ***   0.107 ***
         (0.996)    (0.006)    (0.003)    (0.010)    (0.013)    (0.005)   
Principal Fixed Effect X X X X X X   
N (Principals)     516        518        518        522        522        522   
























New Principal   1.168 ***   1.112 ***    1.087 *  
(4.464)    (3.405)     (2.352)   
2. New Principal at School with Control for Prior Experience
New Principal   1.114 **    1.086 *      1.074   
(2.801)    (2.439)     (0.794)   
Prior Years of Principal Experience (in Any School)   0.983 ***   0.991 *      0.995   
(‐3.370)    (‐1.976)    (‐0.168)   
3. First­Time New Principal at School
First Time New Principal This Year   1.141 **    1.086 *      1.075   
(2.989)    (2.172)     (1.072)   
New Principal to School, but with Prior Experience   1.207 ***   1.149 **     1.102   
at another School in District (3.743)    (2.883)     (1.549)   
4. Temporary/Interim Principal
Temporary/Interim Principal   1.101 *     1.036       1.016   
(2.225)    (0.915)     (0.086)   
5. Principal Experience
Years at Current School   0.950 **    0.972       0.960   
(‐2.698)    (‐1.584)    (‐0.336)   
Time‐Varying Teacher Controls ‐‐‐    X X   
Time‐Varying School Controls ‐‐‐ X X
School Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ X
Year Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ X X
Clustered SE (School by Year) X X X
Notes: +p<.10*, p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 The outcome is whether the teacher left their school at the end of 
the year. The models are restricted to teachers under the age of 62 (to omit those who leave due to 






New Principal This Year  ‐0.005 **   ‐0.004 *     ‐0.005 ** 
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School   0.000     ‐0.019 +     ‐0.080 ***
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.015)    
2. New Principal, Control for Year before New Principal
Year Before New Principal  ‐0.002     ‐0.004 *     ‐0.001    
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
New Principal This Year  ‐0.005 **   ‐0.005 **    ‐0.006 ***
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School   0.002     ‐0.023 *     ‐0.082 ***
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.016)    
3. First­Time New Principal at School
First Time New Principal This Year  ‐0.012 ***  ‐0.011 ***   ‐0.010 ***
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
New Principal to School, but with Prior Experience   0.002      0.003      ‐0.000    
at another School in District (0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.005     ‐0.024 *     ‐0.088 ***
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.015)    
4. Temporary/Interim Principal
Temporary/Interim Principal  ‐0.004 +    ‐0.004 *   ‐0.011 ***
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.007     ‐0.018 *     ‐0.064 ***
(0.005)    (0.008)     (0.011)    
5. Principal Experience (Continuous)
Years at Current School   0.001      0.004 **     0.003 ** 
(0.001)    (0.001)     (0.001)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School   0.003     ‐0.018 +     ‐0.081 ***
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.015)    
6. New Principal with Interactions
New Principal This Year  ‐0.002     ‐0.013 ***
(0.003)    (0.003)   
Prior Years of Principal Experience (Any School)   0.002 ***   0.000   
(0.000)    (0.001)   
New Principal*Prior Years Principal Experience   0.001      0.004 ***
(0.001)    (0.001)   
Control for Lag of Outcome X X X
Time‐Varying Student Controls X X X
Time‐Varying School Controls X X X
Time‐Varying Classroom Controls X X X
School Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ X X
Student Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ X
Grade Fixed Effect XXX
Year Fixed Effect X X X
Notes: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 Test scores are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1 within each year and grade. Each numbered panel represents a separate 
model. Time‐varying student‐level controls include limited English proficiency, free or reduced priced 
lunch eligibility, and retention status. Class characteristics include percent black, percent female, 
percent eligible for free or reduced priced lunches, percent limited English proficicient and average 
prior achievement. School‐level controls include percent minority and percent eligible for free or 






New Principal This Year  ‐0.011 ***  ‐0.005 *     ‐0.004 *  
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.007     ‐0.022 +     ‐0.022    
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.017)    
2. New Principal, Control for Year before New Principal
Year Before New Principal  ‐0.010 ***  ‐0.002      ‐0.003    
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
New Principal This Year  ‐0.012 ***  ‐0.005 *     ‐0.005 *  
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.007     ‐0.023 *     ‐0.022    
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.017)    
3. First­Time New Principal at School
First Time New Principal This Year  ‐0.016 ***  ‐0.005 *     ‐0.004    
(0.002)    (0.003)     (0.002)    
New Principal to School, but with Prior Experience  ‐0.007 **   ‐0.004 +     ‐0.005 *  
at another School in District (0.002)    (0.003)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.010     ‐0.022 *     ‐0.021    
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.017)    
4. Temporary/Interim Principal
Temporary/Interim Principal  ‐0.007 **    0.000      ‐0.002    
(0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.019 ***  ‐0.017 *     ‐0.022+    
(0.005)    (0.008)     (0.012)    
5. Principal Experience (Continuous)
Years at Current School   0.006 ***   0.004 ***    0.004 ** 
(0.001)    (0.001)     (0.001)    
Proportion of New Teachers at School  ‐0.001     ‐0.020 +     ‐0.020    
(0.006)    (0.011)     (0.017)    
6. New Principal with Interactions
New Principal This Year   0.002     ‐0.001   
(0.003)    (0.003)   
Prior Years of Principal Experience (Any School)   0.003 ***   0.002 ***
(0.000)    (0.001)   
New Principal*Prior Years Principal Experience  ‐0.002 **   ‐0.000   
(0.001)    (0.001)   
Control for Lag of Outcome X X X
Time‐Varying Student Controls X X X
Time‐Varying School Controls X X X
Time‐Varying Classroom Controls X X X
School Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ X X
Student Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ X
Grade Fixed Effect XXX
Year Fixed Effect X X X
Notes: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 Test scores are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1 within each year and grade. Each numbered panel represents a separate 
model. Time‐varying student‐level controls include limited English proficiency, free or reduced priced 
lunch eligibility, and retention status. Class characteristics include percent black, percent female, 
percent eligible for free or reduced priced lunches, percent limited English proficicient and average 
prior achievement. School‐level controls include percent minority and percent eligible for free or 
reduced priced lunches. 43 
 
Table 10. Principal Turnover and Student Achievement with Interactions by School Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MATH ACHIEVEMENT
1. New Principal at School
New Principal  ‐0.001     ‐0.003     ‐0.003     ‐0.000  ‐0.002     ‐0.003 +  
(0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002)   
New Principal*School Characteristics  ‐0.047 **   ‐0.038 *    ‐0.006     ‐0.020 ***  ‐0.017 ***  ‐0.015 ***
(0.016)    (0.016)    (0.006)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.004)   
2. Principal Experience at a School
Principal Experience   0.003 *     0.002      0.003 *     0.002   0.002      0.001   
(0.002)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001)   
Principal Experience*School Characteristic  ‐0.008      0.120 +     0.007 +     0.013 **    0.011 ***   0.010 ***
(0.067)    (0.070)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
READING ACHIEVEMENT
1. New Principal at School
New Principal  ‐0.005 *    ‐0.004 *     0.000      0.000  ‐0.004 +    ‐0.003   
(0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002)   
New Principal*School Characteristics  ‐0.020     ‐0.062 ***  ‐0.016 **   ‐0.032 ***  ‐0.005     ‐0.006   
(0.016)    (0.015)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
2. Principal Experience at a School
Principal Experience   0.005 ***   0.003 +     0.002 +     0.001   0.004* *       0 . 0 0 4*    
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001)   
Principal Experience*School Characteristic  ‐0.261 ***  ‐0.018      0.009 **    0.018 ***   0.002     ‐0.001   
(0.063)    (0.065)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
Control for Percent New Teachers to School X X X X X X
C o n t r o l   f o r   L a g   o f   O u t c o m e XXX XX X
Time‐Varying Student, School, Class Controls X X X X X X
S c h o o l   F i x e d   E f f e c t XXX XX X
Student Fixed Effect ‐‐‐ X ‐‐‐ X ‐‐‐ X
G r a d e   F i x e d   E f f e c t XXX XX X
Y e a r   F i x e d   E f f e c t XXX XX X
Notes: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 Test scores are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 within each grade 
and year. Failing schools are those that received an accountability grade of F in the prior year. High poverty schools are those in the top 
quartile of students receiving free or reduced priced lunches. Poverty status, accountability grades, and the first year teacher measure vary 











% with Prior  Yrs Prin Master's Yrs Prin Yrs Prin Master's  First Yr
Prin Exp Experience Degree Experience at School Degree Principal
Free Lunch Quartiles
Quartile 1 (Low Poverty)  0.65 3.94 0.65 4.75 3.07 0.70 0.11
Quartile 4 (High Poverty)  0.30 2.21 0.56 3.43 2.48 0.62 0.20
Math Low Ach Quartiles
Quartile 1 (Few Low Ach)  0.66 3.34 0.55 5.50 3.77 0.72 0.07
Quartile 4 (Many Low Ach)  0.38 2.40 0.61 2.99 2.37 0.65 0.21
Reading Low Ach Quartiles
Quartile 1 (Few Low Ach)  0.61 3.63 0.61 5.47 3.63 0.73 0.09
Quartile 4 (Many Low Ach)  0.47 2.79 0.64 2.84 2.22 0.64 0.23
School Accountability Grades
A 0.46 2.92 0.57 5.08 3.43 0.69 0.13
F 0.50 3.10 0.30 2.47 1.97 0.67 0.26
New Principals to a School All Principals at a School